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It's the Economy (and Combined Ratio),
Stupid: Examining the Medical Malpractice
Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors
Critical to Reform
Mitchell J.Nathanson*
I.

Introduction

Certainly, it is difficult to frown upon the nobility of one who
undertakes to reform a perceived crisis. And even if we, who stand back
on the sidelines, disagree with the proposed course of reform, we are
nevertheless often relieved that at least something is being done.
Because after all, something is better than nothing, is it not?
Unfortunately, as it pertains to the much publicized medical malpractice
crisis, it is often far worse, with the result being that minor crises are
transformed into major ones and major ones are transformed into crises
of catastrophic social and economic potential.
Since the first perceived malpractice crisis of the 1970s, legislatures
from all fifty states have taken various steps intended to reduce the costs
associated with medical malpractice litigation as a means to increase the
availability of reasonably priced health care services for their citizens.'
Unfortunately, however noble their intentions and despite the wide
variety of approaches taken by these legislatures over the past thirty
years, these efforts have one thing in common: they all, to a large degree,

* Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, Villanova University School of Law.
Before coming to Villanova, Professor Nathanson was a litigator in the Healthcare Group
of White and Williams in Philadelphia, PA and an Insurance Coverage Specialist with
ACE USA (formerly CIGNA Property and Casualty Companies). He would like to thank
Margaret Maucher for her invaluable research assistance and Dean Diane Edelman for
her thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. See Insurance Information Institute, Hot Topics and Insurance Issues, at
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) (on
file with author) (noting that subsequent to the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s,
every state except West Virginia passed reforms). West Virginia would later join the
fold.
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failed, as is indicated by the subsequent malpractice crises of the 1980s
and early 2000s, with each crisis more severe than the one preceding it.
Moreover, not only have these legislative efforts failed to rectify the
existing problems, they have, in some cases, created new, far more
serious ones. With the federal government threatening to intervene and
impose sweeping new reforms, which would supercede previously
enacted reforms on the state level, the time has come to examine the
past so as to avoid similar peril in the future.
It is the position of this Article that, for the most part, malpractice
litigation reform has repeatedly failed because the crisis has not been
appropriately identified.3 This is largely because, contrary to the widely
held view, there has never been a medical malpractice litigation crisis,
per se. Rather, if anything, there have been cyclical insurance crises
throughout the years, crises that have more to do with fluctuations in the
bond market than anything associated with medical malpractice
litigation. This is not to suggest, however, that malpractice litigation
costs in no way affect physicians' malpractice premium rates and,
consequently, the availability of quality health care to the public. To the
contrary, these costs significantly affect premium rates in years in which
the bond market is weak. Consequently, it is necessary to stabilize these
costs in order to correct an insurance system which presently reacts
violently in response to market fluctuations.
In order to effectively do so, however, it is necessary to examine the
medical malpractice reform issue through the eyes of the insurer, as it is
the insurer that ultimately sets these rates and determines whether it is
profitable to enter any given market. For if a particular method of reform
is seen as a road block to profitability from the insurer's perspective, the
insurer will avoid the offending market altogether, thereby reducing the
pool of prospective insurers and causing premiums to spike not for
reasons related to malpractice litigation, but because of the absence of a
competitive marketplace.
Simply stated, because the goal of malpractice reform should be to

2. See Bush To Discuss Malpractice Reform, Jan. 16, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/allpolitics/01 / 16/bush.malpractice/index.html
(noting that
despite his "states' rights credentials," the President believes in a nationwide cap).
3. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-01 (2004); Lerman v. Heeman,
685 A.2d 782, 788 (Md. 1996) (stating that the "goal of Health Care Malpractice Claims
Act is to lower cost of litigation involving allegations of malpractice"); see also
Pearlstein v. Malunney, 500 So.2d. 585, 586 (Fla. 1986) (stating, without accompanying
factual support, that Florida's Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985
"was enacted in response to a perceived crisis in availability of reasonably-priced health
care services, prompted by escalating medical malpractice insurance premiums"). These
vague, unsupported statements are indicative of the willingness of courts and legislatures
to act in response to the crisis without first identifying the root cause.
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create competition by enticing insurers to enter the market, any reform
must necessarily increase the insurers' profitability. This Article will
analyze the three most common methods of medical malpractice reform
undertaken over the past thirty years (the creation of medical malpractice
screening and arbitration panels; the imposition of caps and multipliers
on non-economic and/or punitive damage judgments; and the
requirement of expert-based certificates of merit produced at the
pleadings stage) in order to determine whether they do in fact result in
increased insurer profitability.
This Article will show that despite the best intentions of the various
and numerous legislatures that passed them, screening and arbitration
panels actually increase litigation costs and considerably reduce insurer
profitability. In addition, although capping of damages does not result in
any additional economic harm to the insurer, it has had minimal positive
impact at best and has exacted enormous social costs. The certificate of
merit requirement, on the other hand, has proven effective in reducing
insurers' litigation costs without significant social costs. However,
because many jurisdictions employ the certificate of merit requirement
along with other, less effective, and more damaging means of litigation
reform, the benefits of the certificate of merit reform are often cancelled
out by the deleterious effects of the more harmful reform approaches.
II.

The Roots of a Medical Malpractice "Crisis"

A. The Traditional (Majority)Perception
Historically, there has been little debate concerning the genesis of
the malpractice crises. The popular perception has been that the
problems began in the 1960s and 1970s, as was believed to be evidenced
by a perceived increase in malpractice claims during that era.4 That, in
turn, was presumed to have led to a corresponding rise in malpractice
premium rates altered in order to offset these rising costs. 5 As for why

the number of claims suddenly rose during that era, commentators
pointed to several factors, including the increased litigiousness of
American society as a whole and the breakdown of the intimate
relationship between doctor and patient.6 It was widely believed that
these societal changes (trumpeted loudly by the media) set off a vicious
cycle, which resulted in an avalanche of medical malpractice litigation.'
4. See Terry L. Trimble, The Maryland Survey: 1994-1995 Recent Developments
The Maryland GeneralAssembly, 55 MD. L. REv. 893, 894 (1996).
5. Id.
6. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.
7. Id.
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Thus, this increase in litigation and media coverage was thought to
have spurred the first malpractice crisis of the 1970s. For the first time,
it has been argued, large segments of society not only felt disconnected
from their health care providers, but were made aware of the medical
profession's vulnerability to litigation as well.8 Given the rise of
institutionalized medicine and the loss of the close relationship between
doctor and patient, patients were now less hesitant to sue based on
unfortunate medical results-irrespective of actual malpractice. 9
Moreover, as the crisis of the 1970s deepened and more and more
lawsuits were filed (with large jury verdicts and medical errors
highlighted in the media like never before), a distrust developed between
patients and health care providers, with patients starting to believe that
medical standards were declining-a distrust that has only increased in
magnitude over the past thirty years.' 0
Given this increasingly hostile climate, it was only natural that
malpractice claims would increase. And once claims increased, insurers
were left with no choice but to raise premium rates in order to offset the
skyrocketing costs associated with this litigation explosion." These
rising costs, in turn, caused some insurers to leave the market altogether,
thereby deepening the crisis even further as the market for available
insurance contracted.' 2
In fact, one commentator pinpoints the
commencement of the Maryland malpractice crisis of 1975 as the day the
state's largest malpractice carrier announced that it was withdrawing
from the Maryland malpractice market after the state's insurance
commissioner refused a requested rate increase.13
Thus, under the above (traditional) view, there is little doubt as to
the root cause of the malpractice crisis. An increase in litigation led to
rising costs, which led to one of two outcomes: either the insurers
(a) raised their rates in order to offset these costs, necessarily to levels
that caused their insurance to be overwhelmingly expensive, or (b) left
the market altogether. Either way, under the traditional perception, the
cause and effect between malpractice litigation and a malpractice crisis is
direct and clear.
8. Id.; see also Robert J. Blendon, Sc.D. et al., Patient Safety: Views of Practicing
Physiciansand the Public on Medical Errors,347 N. ENG. J. MED. 1933 (Dec. 12, 2002).
The article made note of the fact that surveys indicated that half of the American public
followed media coverage of a recent report by the Institute of Medicine, entitled To Err Is
Human, which concluded that more Americans die as a result of medical errors made in
hospitals than as a result of injuries from automobile accidents.
9. Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.
10. See id.
11. Trimble, supra note 4, at 894.
12. See id.; see also Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.
13. Trimble, supra note 4, at 895.
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Moreover, although most commentators acknowledge that the past
thirty years have seen three clear eras of "crisis" (the mid 1970s, mid
1980s, and early 2000s), 14 they nevertheless view the malpractice crisis
as a single, gradually evolving phenomenon, with roots firmly planted in
the 1960s and early 1970s.15
B.

The Emerging (Minority) Viewpoint

As much as the above hypothesis concerning the roots of the
malpractice crisis makes intuitive sense, recent studies have shown that it
Rather, these studies (discussed below)
is simply not accurate.
demonstrate that it is the economy, and not an increase in litigation,
which accounts for the various malpractice crises. However, these
studies go further and attack the traditional perspective as rhetoric
propagated by the insurance industry and foisted upon the medical
community and public as an excuse for skyrocketing rates.' 6 Further,
and somewhat curiously, these studies conclude that the insurance
industry is at fault for these malpractice crises due to investment
mismanagement.' 7 Although the minority viewpoint's statistical proof
regarding the root cause of rising premiums is persuasive, their resulting
conclusion (laying blame solely at the feet of the insurance industry) is
not.
These studies, performed by a coalition of nearly 100 consumer
groups around the country entitled "Americans for Insurance Reform"
("AIR"), are perhaps most surprising for their conclusion that there has
historically been no relation between malpractice payouts and
premiums.' 8 Contrary to the cause and effect supposition discussed
above, the AIR studies found that, over the past thirty years, the amount
that medical malpractice insurers have paid out (including jury awards as
well as settlements) directly tracks the rate of medical inflation.' 9 Thus,

14. See Americans for Insurance Reform, Medical Malpractice Insurance: Stable
Losses/Unstable Rates, at http://www.insurance-reform.org (Oct. 12, 2002) [hereinafter
Stable Losses/UnstableRates].
15. See Trimble, supra note 4, at 894.
16. See Stable Losses/Unstable Rates, supra note 14; see also Washington State
Medical Association, The Real Story About Medical MalpracticeInsurance and Tort Law
Reform (Federal and State), at http://www.wsma.org/tort-resources.html (last visited
Feb. 1, 2004) [hereinafter The Real Story].
17. See Stable Losses/Unstable Rates, supra note 14.
18. See id.; see also Americans for Insurance Reform, New Study Shows Average
Medical Malpractice Payout over Last Decade Only $28,524; New Data Reveals Same
Trends in 2001, at http://www.insurance-reform.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2004)
[hereinafter New Study].
19. Stable Losses/Unstable Rates, supra note 14. While the author of the report fails
to define "medical inflation," it is believed to be the equivalent of general inflation.
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despite the alarms rung as a result of the breakdown of the traditional
doctor-patient relationship and the increased media attention paid to
medical mistakes and jury verdicts, this has not translated to a resulting
explosion in payouts to medical malpractice claimants.20
Premiums, the studies found, are a different story. Rather than
correspond to payouts, they rise and fall in direct relation to the state of
the economy.2 1 More specifically, premiums rise when interest rates
fall.22 Examining the two prior malpractice crises (which occurred in the
mid 1970s and mid 1980s respectively), the studies found that the crises
23
occurred during years of a weakened economy and falling interest rates.
Although each crisis brought attempts at malpractice reform in many
states, it only subsided when the economy finally recovered and interest
rates rose.24
The results of these studies beg the obvious question: Were these
correlations merely due to coincidence, or is there a reason why
premiums track interest rates so closely? A detailed examination of the
investment strategies of the insurance industry provides insight into why
the correlation between premiums and interest rates is both real and
direct.
25
Not surprisingly, the insurance industry is a highly regulated one.
Investments made on behalf of insurers are monitored both in kind and
quality by every state in which an insurer does business.2 6 Moreover,
and more specific to the medical malpractice issue, 80% of the
investments made by Physician Insurers Association of America member
companies are required to be in high grade bonds.27 This is consistent
with the investment practice and requirements of most commercial
insurers who annually target at least 80% of their investment dollars for
the conservative, high grade, low yield bond market.2 8 When the bond
market is strong, as it was during much of the 1990s, insurers are able to
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See The Real Story, supra note 16; see also Steve Kanigher, Medical
Malpractice: The Costs of Coverage, LAS VEGAS SUN WEEKEND EDITION, June 21, 2002,
available at http://www.lasvegassun.com (discussing the connection between rising
premiums and the state mandated investment strategies of Nevada's insurers. The article
noted that malpractice rates in Nevada are regulated by the Nevada Insurance Division.
In addition, Nevada, like other states, requires insurers to keep most of their investments
in government and corporate bonds that carry at least an "A" rating).
26. See The Real Story, supra note 16.
27. See id.
28. See Doctors Take to Streets To Win Malpractice Reforms, Feb. 1, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com [hereinafter Doctors Take to Streets].
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keep premium rates low. 29 However, when that market collapses, as it
has done notably three times within the past thirty years (the mid 1970s,
mid 1980s, and early 2000s), investment income drops significantly,
causing premium rates to rise in order to offset this loss of income, and
can even skyrocket if the collapse is particularly acute.3 °
In this regard, the first few years of the twenty-first century have
been historic for two reasons: both in the depths to which the bond
market has plunged as well as the duration of this plunge. As a result,
the medical malpractice crisis of the early 2000s has appeared to be more
severe than anything that came before. 31 The Federal Reserve cut
interest rates repeatedly during this time, diminishing the investment
returns of commercial insurers with every reduction. 32 This, in turn, has
33
caused premiums to increase repeatedly in order to offset these losses.
Thus, according to the emerging minority view, it is the economy, and
not a litigation explosion, which is the cause of the multiple malpractice
"crises. ' 34 Therefore, according to the minority perspective, each crisis
is not a crisis after all, but rather a natural and expected response to the
cyclical nature of the market.35
Although the minority viewpoint is persuasive with regard to its
cause and effect analysis, the conclusions drawn as a result of this
analysis are considerably less so. Commentators adhering to this
position conclude that because it is the economy which dictates premium
36
rates, tort reform is not only unnecessary but irrelevant to the problem.
For support, they point to examples such as Nevada which, in July 2002,
imposed a medical malpractice cap of $350,000 on non-economic
damages, only to be informed mere weeks later that despite the new law,
two major insurers still insisted that they would not reduce rates in the
foreseeable future.3 7 The problem, as these commentators see it, is not
simply the economy but, as stated above, investment mismanagement on
behalf of the insurance industry, which allows the insurance industry to
fall victim to these economic swings.38 As insurers have made their own
bed, the argument concludes, they should be forced to lie in it. However,
29. Id.; see also Stable Losses/UnstableRates, supra note 14.
30. See Doctors Take to Streets, supra note 28. The article noted that between 1990
and 2002, bond yields, the main source of insurers' income, were down practically 50%,
from 9% to approximately 5%. Id. These losses invariably left insurers to look to the
premium market as a source to recoup this dramatic decrease in income.
31. See Kanigher, supra note 25.
32. See Stable Losses/Unstable Rates, supra note 14.
33. See Doctors Take to Streets, supra note 28.
34. Stable Losses/Unstable Rates, supra note 14.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See supra notes 24-29.
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as the following section shows, this is not necessarily the case.
C. Reconciling the Majority and Minority Viewpoints
The AIR studies are invaluable for challenging the traditional
perception of the recurring medical malpractice crises. Although
statistics certainly never tell the entire story, they are helpful in testing
the validity of assumptions-particularly ones which, at least on the
surface, appear logical. Upon further review, in light of these studies, it
now no longer appears that there is much validity to the historically
popular view, which blames an increase in claims as the culprit for these
crises. Rather, it is more likely that market factors play a substantial role
in determining premium rates and that, when the bond market is weak,
rates rise and create a perceived "crisis. 3 9
However, the conclusions drawn as a result of this market-based
analysis do not appear to be as soundly based. For it is difficult to
understand how the economic link between bond rates and premium rates
is somehow the result of the insurance industry's mismanagement of
investments. As most investors understand, the bond market typically
represents the safest, most conservative investment opportunities. While,
as the "junk bond" scandals of the 1980s attest, there are certainly risks
present in the bond market, most states prohibit commercial insurers
conducting business within their borders from investing in these more
risky opportunities, requiring them instead to limit their investments to
those government or corporate bonds carrying at least an "A" rating.4 °
Because most states, as well as the largest insurance associations, also
require their member insurers to target a minimum of 80% of their
investment dollars toward these most conservative of investments, 41 it
simply does not logically follow that such an approach represents a
mismanaged investment scheme. Even if it were a mismanaged scheme,
the fault for such an approach cannot rightfully be laid at the feet of the
42
insurance industry, for the approach is governmentally imposed upon it.
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a preferable alternative
investment model. The reduction of governmental control would most
likely lead to riskier investments, which, over the past three decades,
may very well have resulted in heavy reliance on technology and/or
Internet stocks as well as the aforementioned junk bonds. Given the
steep decline of the stock market in the early 2000s, it is safe to assume
that these investment strategies would have led to premium rate spikes at
39.
40.
41.
42.

See supra notes 20-23.
See Kanigher, supra note 25.
See supra notes 24-27.
See Kanigher, supra note 25.
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least as severe, if not much more so, than the ones that otherwise
resulted.
More appropriately, if there was mismanagement from the
standpoint of the insurer, it did not result from poor investment strategies
but was, rather, the result of aggressive and shortsighted pushes during
strong markets to increase market share.43 During these economic boom
times, some insurers have historically resorted to slashing premiums to
encourage new customers, and/or expanding geographically or into
additional healthcare markets, in an effort to gain access to the additional
premium dollars generated so as to be able to invest them in the
expanding market. 4 Although access to this additional money results in
short term gains, these gains are more than offset during down markets
when the additional claims emerge, claims resulting from artificially low
premiums which can do nothing but result in a net loss to the insurer's
bottom line. 45 Although this practice certainly adds to the severity of the
crises, which result from down markets, it is difficult to curtail. Even
though malpractice insurance rates are regulated by each state's
insurance division, it is highly unlikely that any division would take the
politically suicidal approach of mandating higher premium rates on
behalf of insurers.46
The AIR studies can also be criticized for their conclusion that,
given the strong market forces that currently determine premium rates,
tort reform of any sort is irrelevant to the problem. Although the studies
are helpful in demonstrating why the types of reforms attempted in the
past have largely failed, their usefulness as a predictive tool is much less
clear. Moreover, it is difficult to fathom how the absence of reform will
solve the problem of cyclically spiking premiums because, to the
contrary, the studies indicate that without reform the problem is destined
to recur every decade or so, throwing the healthcare industry into a crisis
mode regardless of the cause.
Without effective change on some level, malpractice premiums can
43. Id.; see also Josh Goldstein, Collapse Spreads Miser, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 2,
2003, at El. Goldstein's article analyzes the collapse of one of the Philadelphia area's
largest malpractice insurers, PHICO. The article concludes that miscalculated growth
opportunities eventually led to the liquidation of PHICO in 2002.
44. Goldstein, supra note 43. The article highlights PHICO's premium-slashing
techniques as a means to gain market share in the "highly competitive malpractice
insurance marketplace." Id.
45. Id. The article notes that PHICO eventually expanded into all fifty states. This
resulted in a short term doubling of PHICO's premium revenue but an eventual tripling of
payments on claims. Id.
46. See Kanigher, supra note 25. According to the executive vice president of
Nevada Mutual Insurance Company: "It's very difficult for a state regulatory agency to
tell you that you need to increase rates. That doesn't fly well so there's a lot of political
pressure on them not to raise rates." Id.
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be expected to soar out of control every several years, creating an
environment where many physicians are no longer able to obtain
affordable insurance. To simply accept this lurking economic doomsday
as inevitable and to tell doctors to "wait it out" until the bond market
recovers is to ignore the hardships that accompany these cyclical
downturns. These hardships figure only to increase in magnitude with
each successive crisis because, with the increasing prevalence of Health
Maintenance Organizations and Medicare and their ever expanding
power to dictate and cut the amount of reimbursements for medical
services rendered, doctors are less able than ever before to pass on even a
small percentage of their rising premium rates to their patients.4 7 This
trend is likely to continue and become even more pronounced in the
future.
Finally, it is unreasonable to conclude that, despite the historical
power of the market in the establishment of premium rates, this is the
sole factor that determines insurer profitability and therefore premium
rates. For if this were truly the case, then all lines of insurance should be
expected to see sharply spiking premiums whenever the bond market
weakens. This, in turn, would logically create a crisis in all lines of
insurance, rather than just the malpractice market. However, this has not
happened. Historically, only the medical malpractice and product
liability lines have seen recurrent crises over the past thirty years, as
dictated by the bond market.4 8 Therefore, there clearly is something
different about these lines that makes them more market sensitive than
others. The AIR studies correctly identify the root cause of the recurrent
malpractice crises but then fail to ask the appropriate question based on
the results of their studies. Contrary to the finger pointing of the AIR
and its insistence that tort reform is irrelevant to the issue, the correct
47.

See Doctors Take to Streets, supra note 28.

The article noted that the

malpractice crisis of the early 2000s is worse than the ones which occurred in the 1970s
and 1980s because medical services rates are now largely controlled by physician
contracts with HMO's and Medicare. Id. This results in the increasing inability of
physicians to pass on at least part of their rising premiums to patients. Id.
48. See Frances E. Zollers, Dandra N. Hurd & Peter Shears, Looking Backward,
Looking Forward: Reflections on Twenty Years of Product Liability Reform, 50
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019, 1024, 1028-29 (2000). The authors note that federal legislative

efforts to reform product liability litigation began in the late 1970s. Id. An explosion of
lawsuits, excessive awards, and skyrocketing insurance premiums were cited as the
reasons necessitating reform. Id. More likely, and as with the medical malpractice
insurance market, the declining bond market of the time was to blame for rising rates.
This supposition is supported by the fact that the authors note that a second product
liability "crisis" occurred in the mid 1980s, when insurance premiums nearly tripled. Id.
As this second "crisis" likewise mirrors the mid 1980s bond market decline, which
precipitated the second medical malpractice "crisis," it is apparent that the product
liability insurance premium market, much like the medical malpractice insurance
premium market, is overwhelmingly market-driven.
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question in light of their findings is: Why does medical malpractice
insurance become unprofitable when the bond market crashes, while
most other lines maintain profitability? Stated another way: What
accounts for the acute market sensitivity of the medical malpractice line
of insurance? Only after that question is answered can the issue of tort
reform be properly addressed.
The AIR studies are correct in their conclusion that, historically, tort
reform has failed. However, that does not necessarily mean that it cannot
work in the future. The traditional perception may have been incorrect in
its identification of the root cause of the malpractice crisis, but it
nevertheless is correct in its insistence that reform of some type is
necessary. For the market, being the market, will continue to rise and
fall cyclically forever. It is unreasonable to expect the medical
profession to "grin-and-bear-it" during the down periods, particularly
considering the strong likelihood that reimbursements will only continue
to decrease in the future. 49 The key is identifying the type of reform that
will respond to the problem.
In order to do so, it is first necessary to understand how profitability
is measured from the insurer's perspective. Once this is identified, it will
then be possible to judge whether a particular type of reform will impact
this measurement. For if it does not, then it is truly, as the AIR studies
suggest, irrelevant to the problem. However, if the reform does impact
the measurement, then it is highly relevant because if it enables medical
malpractice insurers to remain profitable even during down markets, it
will bring the medical malpractice line of insurance in line with other
types of insurance, which remain profitable even when the bond market
is weak.5 ° It would then enable malpractice insurance to behave
similarly to other, more stable insurance lines and avoid periods of crisis
during market downturns. The following section will analyze the
determination of insurer profitability through a discussion of the three
holiest words in the insurance industry: the combined ratio.
III.

Determining Insurer Profitability Through the Combined Ratio

In order to understand profitability as measured by the insurance
industry, it is necessary to become familiar with the combined ratio. At
its most basic level, the combined ratio represents the percentage of each
dollar collected, in the form of insurance premium, spent on claims, legal
expenses (defense costs), and underwriting costs. 5' It is the sum of two
49.
50.

Kanigher, supra note 25.
See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.

51.

INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE

FACT BOOK 2002, at 23 (2002) [hereinafter FACT BOOK].
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other ratios: the loss ratio, which expresses the relationship between
losses and premiums in percentage terms; and the expense ratio, which
expresses the relationship between underwriting costs and premiums in
percentage terms. 52 When combined, the loss and expense ratios express
profitability or loss in the absence of investment income (i.e., the
relationship between the amount of money coming in through
underwriting income and the amount of money going out through losses
and other expenses).53 Conveniently for calculation purposes, a
combined ratio of 100 is considered the "break even" point, with
combined ratios under 100 indicating a net profit (absent investment
income), and combined ratios over 100 indicating a net loss (again,
absent investment income).54 For example, an insurer with a combined
ratio of 95 spends 95 cents on losses and expenses for every dollar of
underwriting income it takes in, generating a net profit of 5 cents per
premium dollar. Conversely, an insurer with a combined ratio of 105
spends $1.05 on losses and expenses for every dollar of underwriting
income it generates, resulting in a net loss of 5 cents per premium dollar.
Of course, as stated above, this ratio does not take into account
investment income which, as shown through the AIR studies, can
radically alter the profit/loss picture drawn by the combined ratio,
sometimes to the point of consuming it whole. 55 For instance, in 1995
the overall combined ratio for the United States' property and casualty
insurance industry was 105; a small loss which was more than offset by
investment income resulting from the high interest rates and vigorous
economy of the time.56 However, when the bond market weakens
significantly, investment income can no longer offset these losses. As a
result, those lines of insurance with the highest combined ratios
undoubtedly suffer the most. Not surprisingly, the medical malpractice
insurance market is one of those lines.
Specifically, the combined ratio of the medical malpractice
insurance market as a whole marched notably higher and higher through
the 1990s and into the early 2000s. 7 Between 1991 and 2000, the
combined ratio in this line jumped from a respectable 103.7 to a robust

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also Stable Losses/Unstable Rates, supra note 14. This illustrates the
extent to which bond market fluctuations dictate medical malpractice insurer profitability
regardless of the combined ratio. Although, historically, the bond market has determined
profitability in both up and down cycles, it is the position of this Article that this does not
have to be the case.
56. See FACT BOOK, supra note 51, at 23.
57. Id. at 74.
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133.558 This skyrocketing trend continued in 2001 when it shot up
another 6.5 points to 140, meaning that, nationwide, medical malpractice
insurers were paying out $1.40 in losses and expenses for every premium
dollar they were taking in.59 While this differential may have been
tolerable in a strong market (where investment income becomes the
overriding factor), it is unquestionably intolerable in a weak one (where
investment income becomes irrelevant and where premiums must track
losses closely in order for the insurer to maintain profitability).6 °
The strikingly high medical malpractice combined ratio explains
why the medical malpractice insurance line is more market-sensitive than
most others. Although net losses are more than offset by investment
income from the strong bond market when interest rates are high, they
become an albatross around an insurer's neck when the market softens
and bond rates plummet. This market-driven scenario differs from the
nationwide property and casualty market as a whole, which throughout
the 1990s maintained a combined ratio between 99.9 and 108.8, allowing
it to reap substantial profits when the bond market was strong but suffer
only minimal losses when the market crashed. 6 1 Although it is likely that
premiums likewise rose as the market fell, they undoubtedly did not
spike as sharply as the medical malpractice line, as there was much less
of a net loss to account for. Certain lines, such as the burglary and theft
line, most likely saw little or no premium increases at all when the bond
market fell due to annual combined ratios typically in the low 60s.62
Others, such as the personal auto and homeowner's lines, probably saw
small 63premium increases due to combined ratios typically in the low
100S.

Given the above, the goal of any medical malpractice reform should
be to reduce the combined ratio and bring it as close to 100 as possible.
This will cause the medical malpractice line to behave like the property
and casualty line overall and reduce its sensitivity to fluctuations of the
market, because when the bond market is weak and premiums have no
choice but to track losses closely, the corresponding rate increases will
be far less dramatic and the recurrent crises will be averted. 64 Moreover,
on a purely economic level, because lowering the combined ratio will
58. Id.
59. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.
60. See The Real Story, supra note 16 (discussing how when investment yields
decline due to falling interest rates, they are no longer able to subsidize premium rates to
the extent they once did. Therefore, in weak markets, premium rates must necessarily
closely match the actual cost of losses in order to maintain the insurer's profitability).
61. See FACT BOOK, supra note 51, at 23.
62. Id. at 79.
63. Id. at 35, 60.
64. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.
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stabilize the medical malpractice line and increase profitability regardless
of the economy, more insurers will have incentive to enter this
previously dangerous, volatile insurance market.
Once the goal of malpractice reform has been identified, the next
issue is to determine the most effective means towards reaching it.
Importantly, from the insurers' perspective, it does not inherently matter
if reform is focused on reducing indemnity costs, expense (defense)
costs, or a combination of both. As described above, all losses count
equally in the eyes of the combined ratio.65 A dollar spent as the result
of a settlement or jury verdict counts the same as a dollar spent
defending a claim ultimately dismissed for lack of merit. To an insurer,
the sole determination of the effectiveness of any particular method of
reform is its ability to reduce the combined ratio, regardless of the side of
the equation utilized to achieve this goal.
However, most tort reform efforts focus exclusively on payouts and
not defense costs. By way of example, Pennsylvania's 2003 medical
malpractice reform bill contains five elements of tort reform-four
related to reducing indemnity costs (through the abolition of the
collateral source rule, reduction of excessive verdicts, periodic payment
of malpractice verdicts, and reduction to present value of various jury
awards), and none related to the reduction of expense costs. 66 Although
the reasons for this disparity are obvious, they are nonetheless imprudent
if, as will be demonstrated throughout the remainder of this Article, they
are ultimately irrelevant to the reduction of the combined ratio.
In order for a particular method of reform to succeed, it must be
directed towards areas of wasteful spending that could effectively be
reduced. Unfortunately, this level of analysis rarely is undertaken when
reform is proposed, or even adopted. In Pennsylvania, for instance,
which has long been the poster child for all that ails the medical
malpractice litigation industry, much of the push for the most recent
round of reform stems from publicity given to the sheer amount of
money awarded annually in the form of jury verdicts and settlements.6 7
These payouts, in terms of dollar amount as well as the sheer number of
large verdicts and settlements, when viewed in light of skyrocketing
premiums, have mobilized physicians throughout the country to organize
and lobby state legislatures for a reduction of this number, arguing the
65. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
66. H.R. 1802, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2002).
67. See Goldstein, supra note 43. "Doctors and hospitals pushing for changes to the
state malpractice laws have argued that the high Philadelphia jury awards and settlements
are a major reason their malpractice insurance premiums have risen dramatically." Id.
The article also notes that "Philadelphia awards and settlements make up nearly half of
the record $348 million paid out by a state fund in the last twelve months." Id.
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cause and effect connection discussed earlier. 68 However, as popular and
easily embraceable as this argument is, reform geared toward responding
to these indemnity concerns is ultimately fruitless because it is not
directed toward the major area of wasteful spending in the medical
malpractice litigation context. Rather, it is in the area of defense costs
where an abundance of wasteful spending occurs. Although it is perhaps
more difficult to cultivate public outrage over wasted defense cost dollars
than by highlighting an extreme jury verdict, an analysis of the insurance
industry's defense costs in the medical malpractice line of coverage
relative to other lines demonstrates the volume of waste generated in this
area as well as the need for tort reform to be targeted here.
Specifically, of the total amount of incurred losses, medical
malpractice carriers spend approximately 40%, not on indemnity payouts
(either through jury verdicts or settlements), but rather on defense
costs. 6 9 Stated in other terms, approximately 40 cents of every dollar
paid out by medical malpractice insurers is spent defending claims rather
than paying indemnity dollars to claimants.
This defense-cost
containment percentage contrasts sharply with the mere 12-13% spent on
defense costs overall in all insurance lines. 70 As for the cause of this
disparity, one need look no further than the following statistic: between
the years 1985-1999, 62.3% of all filed medical malpractice claims were
eventually dismissed, dropped, or withdrawn in favor of the defendant. 71
This helps explain why medical malpractice insurers spend more each
year defending claims than on all other administrative costs combined.72
The disproportionate amount of money spent by the insurance industry
on meritless claims, as well as the high percentage of them, are telling
indicators of economic waste. While, due to the inherently higher cost of
defending medical malpractice actions relative to other areas of
litigation, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect any reform to bring the
defense-cost containment percentage of medical malpractice carriers in
line with the 12-13% ratio of all lines, it is reasonable to assume that
reform designed to substantially reduce the percentage of meritless
claims would also have a significant effect on this percentage. And if it
reduces this percentage significantly, it will likewise significantly reduce
the combined ratio as well.
Although the traditional perception of the cause of the malpractice
crisis contained the faulty assumption that rising claims led to increased
payouts to plaintiffs, it was nevertheless correct that the increase in
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id.
See FACT BOOK, supra note 51, at 118 (43.2% in 1999 and 38.5% in 2000).
Id. (13.1% in 1999 and 12.0% in 2000).
See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.
See Trimble, supra note 4, at 909.
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claims negatively impacted the insurance market. While the increase in
claims has not exerted a significant impact on the indemnity side of the
combined ratio (as evidenced by the relative stability of payouts from
1991-2000), it has played a large role on the defense side (as evidenced
by the increase in the combined ratio during this time in the absence of a
surge in indemnity costs).

73

Therefore, in order to reduce the combined

ratio, it is the defense side, rather than the indemnity, which needs to be
addressed. Unfortunately, this is rarely done.
The following sections will demonstrate why the historically
popular forms of medical malpractice tort reform (i.e., capping and
screening/arbitration panels) have repeatedly failed: they ultimately
prove irrelevant to the combined ratio and, therefore, are unable to
increase the insurer's profitability during economic downturns. Not
merely ineffective, they have exacted enormous social costs. Only when
the area of economic waste is targeted, i.e., defense costs, will the
combined ratio drop. This Article will conclude that one area of reform,
generally referred to as the certificate of merit requirement, effectively
targets this area and does so not only in a way that significantly reduces
the combined ratio, but in a manner that extracts a minimum of social
costs.
IV. Analysis of Popular Tort Reform Approaches
A.

Medical MalpracticeScreening/ArbitrationPanels
1.

Purpose and Procedure

In the aftermath of the initial medical malpractice crisis of the
1970s, several states responded by creating a wide variety of medical
malpractice screening or arbitration panels, whose mandate was to
determine whether a particular claim had sufficient merit to proceed74
through the judicial (or, depending on the panel, arbitration) system.
The benefits of this system were thought to be threefold: it would
76
75
(1) weed out unjustified suits, and (2) encourage pretrial settlements,

which would (3) ultimately reduce court congestion by decreasing the
volume of cases careening toward trial. 77 This, it was assumed, would
result in reduced liability insurance, which would naturally lead to
73.
74.

See FACT BOOK, supra note 51, at 74.
See Harold A. Sakayan, Arbitration and Screening Panels: Recent Experience

and Trends, 17 FORUM 682 (1982).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.; see also Newell v. Richards, 594 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Md. 1991).
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78
reduced medical care costs.
A very popular method of medical malpractice tort reform, these
screening panels exist, in one form or another, in approximately half of
the states. 79 Although there is some variation from state to state,
generally these panels are comprised of between three and seven
members. 80 Typically, one member is an attorney while another is a
health care provider.8' Some states also require a sitting or retired judge
to sit on the panel,82 while others, such as Maryland, allow for a
layman.83 Procedurally, the hearings are generally more informal than a
trial with relaxed rules of evidence and procedure.8 4 However, they do
have the power to subpoena witnesses and documents. 85 In addition,
most panels allow party statements in either oral or deposition form, the
86
production of medical records, and the testimony of expert witnesses.
A few states even allow the panels to compel a physical examination of
the plaintiff under certain conditions. 87 Finally, and perhaps the most
attractive feature of these panels (at least to defendants), the proceedings
of these panels are typically confidential.88
With regard to the specificity of the findings of these panels, states
vary. Although all states require their panels to make a determination
regarding liability, the ability of these panels to make further findings
varies from state to state.89 Some states limit the panel's role to
determining liability; 90 some allow the panels to determine the existence
and extent of damages but prohibit them from assigning a dollar figure to
these damages; 91 while some permit the panels to make specific findings
92
with regard to both liability and damages, much like a trial court would.
As for the weight given to these findings should a ruling be appealed to

78.

See Sakayan, supra note 74, at 682.

79. See Trimble, supra note 4, at 900.
80. See Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed
Model Legislation To Cure JudicialIlls, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 189 (1990).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 190.
83. See Trimble, supra note 4, at 896.
84. See Macchiaroli, supra note 80, at 190; see also Robert L. Lockaby,
ConstitutionalChallenges to Medical MalpracticeReview Boards, 46 TENN. L. REV. 607,
612 (1979).

85. See Macchiarioli, supra note 80, at 190.
86. Id.
87. Id.; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (b) (Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
18, § 6810 (Supp. 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-13, para. 4 (Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 231, § 60B, para. 5 (1986).
88. See Macchiarioli, supra note 80, at 190.
89. See Lockaby, supra note 84, at 612.
90. Id.
91. Id. Alaska, Delaware, Indiana, Lousiana, and Virginia are such states. Id.
92. Id. Such as Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, and New Hampshire. Id.
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the trial court, Maryland (which permits arbitration panels to assign
dollar values to damage awards) goes so far as to dictate that the findings
of its arbitration panel are presumed correct.93 As a result, the party
rejecting an arbitration award carries the burden of proving that the
award was somehow incorrect.94 However, Maryland courts have been
adamant in stating that this presumption of correctness does not
otherwise shift the common law burden of proof in general. 95
2.

Constitutional Challenges

Generally, medical malpractice screening/arbitration panels have
faced (typically state) constitutional challenges on one or more of the
following four grounds: that they violate (a) the right to a jury trial;
(b) the right of access to courts; (c) equal protection/due process; and/or
(d) separation of powers/impairment of the judicial function. These will
be analyzed in turn.
a.

Right to a Jury Trial

Most often, the challenge to a jury trial right is raised when the
decision of the arbitration panel is admitted into evidence at the trial
level.9 6 When this occurs, some courts have held that this evidence
unduly distorts a jury's decision-making function due to the fear that the
jury will be improperly influenced by the panel's decision and allow it to
cloud their judgment.97 The Ohio Supreme Court, for example, declared
that although the right to trial by jury still existed under the Ohio
arbitration statute, it was no longer a "free and unfettered right as was
certainly intended by the framers. 98 For this reason, Ohio's arbitration
statute was struck down as unconstitutional.
This approach is, however, in the minority. A majority of courts
have held that the right to trial by jury is not impermissibly restricted or
denied by the screening/arbitration panel requirement.99 Indeed, most
93. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06(d) (2004) (Admissibility of
award; presumption of correctness: "Unless vacated by the court pursuant to subsection
(c), the unmodified arbitration award is admissible as evidence in the judicial proceeding.
The award shall be presumed to be correct, and the burden is on the party rejecting it to
prove that it is not correct.").
94. Id.
95. Newell v. Richards, 594 A.2d 1152, 1158 (Md. 1991).
96. See Macchiarioli, supra note 80, at 190.
97. See Lockaby, supra note 84, at 628.
98. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 908 (Ohio 1976).
99. See Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977); Paro v. Longwood Hosp.,
369 N.E. 2d 985 (Mass. 1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977);
Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 App. Div. 304, 390 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Wisconsin ex rel.
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1978).
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courts have held that the admissibility of the panel's decision is a
permissible application of the legislative prerogative to change the rules
of evidence.' 00 These courts have rested this conclusion on the tenet that
the jury remains the final arbiter of the facts in their totality.' 0' Maryland
has perhaps gone the furthest in this regard, holding that the admissibility
of the panel's decision, along with its accompanying "presumption of
correctness," does not
violate the state's constitutional guarantee of a
2
right to trial by jury. 10

b.

Right of Access to the Courts

There are generally two types of challenges grounded in the alleged
violation of a right to judicial access. The first is typically based on the
inherent delay between the time when the allegedly tortious act is
committed and the time when the plaintiff is permitted to proceed at the
trial court level. 10 3 This delay is caused, inevitably, by the relevant
statutory arbitration/screening panel requirement, which mandates that
all claims first pass through this quasi-judicial system before being
permitted to proceed to the trial level. 10 4 This delay has caused great
concern to many state supreme courts, which have recognized it as a
serious constitutional problem. 0 5 This is particularly the case when the
relevant statute does not specify a time frame in which the panel must
render its decision. 106 This can lead to situations such as the one in
Pennsylvania during the 1970s, when it was not uncommon for years 10to7
pass from the time of the plaintiffs initial filing without resolution.
This resulted in a medical malpractice tort system where 73% of all filed
claims were still pending when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally
declared Pennsylvania's statute unconstitutional. 10 8 Such delay, or fear
of similar delays, has been the basis for the decisions in several states
declaring such statutes violative of the right to access the courts. 1°9
100. See supra note 99.
101. See supra note 99.
102. Maryland v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 67-68 (Md. 1978).
103. See id. at 71.
104. See id.
105. Id. (quoting Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice
Insurance Crisis: ConstitutionalImplications,55 TEX. L. REv. 759, 795-96 (1977)).
106. See Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 196 n.5 (1980); see also Heller v.
Frankston, 475 A.2d 1291, 1295 (Pa. 1984).
107. See sources cited supra note 106.
108. See Mattos, 421 A.2d at 196 n.5; see also Heller v. Frankston, 475 A.2d 1291,
1295 (Pa. 1984) ("Such delays are unconscionable and irreparably rip the fabric of public
confidence in the efficiency and effectiveness of our judicial system.").
109. See Mattos, 421 A.2d at 196 n.5; State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem'l Hosp. for
Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979); Aldana v. Holub, 381 S.2d 1080 (Fla.
1980); Gale v. Provident Hosp., 325 N.W.2d 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
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Although the Maryland Supreme Court considered the dangers caused by
such delays, it nevertheless held that they were outweighed by competing
legitimate state interests. 10
The second type of challenge under the right of access to the courts
stems from the fees sometimes generated by the arbitration/screening
panels."' Indeed, a few courts have held that this additional level of
litigation poses the risk of imposing financial hardship upon the plaintiff
over and above those normally associated with litigation at the trial court
level. ' 2 This is particularly the case when the arbitration/screening
panel statute requires the plaintiff to post a bond as a condition precedent
to proceeding to trial.' 13 The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, held
that such a requirement deprived indigent plaintiffs of their right of
access to the courts." 4 The court then went even further and held that
non-indigent medical malpractice plaintiffs were likewise deprived by
imposing a burden on them that was not similarly imposed on other
classes of plaintiffs.' 15
However, when the additional fees are not considered a
precondition to proceeding at the trial court level, courts have been more
willing to adjudge them constitutional. The Maryland statute, for
example, requires the parties to pay a fee to the arbitration panel, a fee
that, obviously, does not exist in litigation not subject to mandatory
arbitration prior to filing at the trial court level." 6 Nevertheless, the
Maryland Supreme Court held that because payment of these fees is not a
precondition to the court proceeding and accompanying jury trial, it is
not violative of Maryland's constitutionally protected right of access to
the courts." 7 The court rejected the argument that knowledge that these
fees will have to be paid at some future point if the suit is lost constitutes
an unreasonable obstruction to this right." 8 Although the Maryland
Supreme Court appears to generally be the exception to the rule with
regard to constitutional challenges in this area, its rulings are helpful in
attempting to draw an appropriate line. Statutes that require the posting
of bonds or that tie the payment of arbitration fees to the ability of the
plaintiff to proceed to the trial level appear to be unconstitutional.
However, when the fee requirement is severed from the ability to
proceed, it is most likely constitutionally sound.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Maryland v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 71 (Md. 1978).
See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (Ariz. 1977).
Id.
Id.; see also Macchiarioli, supra note 80, at 190.
Eastin, 570 P.2d at 754.
Id.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-05(e) (2002).
Maryland v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 74 (Md. 1978).
Id.
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Equal Protection/Due Process

An equal protection/due process challenge rests on the premise that
the existence of the medical malpractice arbitration/screening panels
results in a tort system that impermissibly discriminates between classes
of injured tort victims.1 19 Likewise, such a challenge argues that the
statutorily created panels confer a benefit upon medical malpractice
defendants not available to other defendants, thereby presenting medical
120
malpractice plaintiffs with a greater burden than other plaintiffs.
Whether these constitutional challenges are successful, however,
depends greatly on the standard of review applied to the court's inquiry.
Courts finding a violation of equal protection or due process have
invariably done so after a strict scrutiny review.' 2' Courts refusing to
find an equal protection/due process violation typically base their
holdings upon constitutional reviews under the more permissive rational
basis standard.'2 2 And once again, the Maryland Supreme Court proves
illustrative in highlighting where the judicial line is most likely drawn.
In analyzing this challenge, the Maryland Supreme Court rejected
the Maryland Bar Association's contention that because a fundamental
right was involved, strict scrutiny review was mandated. 23 Specifically,
the Bar Association asserted that the discriminatory classification
described above resulted in an impermissible interference with a
plaintiff s right to a jury trial.' 24 As this is unquestionably a fundamental
right, the Bar Association argued that any equal protection analysis must
be done under the strict scrutiny standard. 25 In rejecting this claim, the
court concluded that because it had already held that Maryland's medical
malpractice arbitration panel did not impermissibly infringe on the
plaintiff s right to a jury trial, no fundamental rights were affected. 126 In
reviewing the equal protection claim under the rational basis standard,
the court held that the distinction created by the arbitration statute
between medical malpractice claimants and other claimants was
reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of the Act, "the protection of
assuring the availability of malpractice
the public health and welfare ' by
27
rates."'
reasonable
at
insurance
As the Maryland Supreme Court decision highlights, the ultimate
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See, e.g., Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 908 (Ohio 1976).
Id.
See id.
Johnson, 385 A.2d at 77-79.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 78-79.
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determination of an equal protection/due process violation necessarily
involves, as a prerequisite, the determination of the right of access to the
courts. 128 If that is violated, then it is bootstrapped into the equal
protection/due process analysis with the result that strict scrutiny review
is mandated. 129 Under that level of review, a constitutional violation is
likely to be found as well.' 30 If, however, it has been judicially
determined that these screening/arbitration panels do not impermissibly
infringe upon the right of access to the courts, then it is likely that no
fundamental rights will be considered implicated under a subsequent
equal protection/due process analysis.' 31 This would then permit an
equal protection/due process review under the more permissible rational
basis standard, resulting in a holding that the panels are constitutionally
sound under this analysis as well. 32 Therefore, because of this
bootstrapping, although numerous claims have been raised on this basis,
equal protection/due process challenges do not appear to be
determinative in the overall constitutional analysis of these statutes.
Rather, they merely pile on, one way or the other.
d.

Separation of Powers/Infringement on the Judicial Function

A
constitutional
challenge
based
on
separation
of
powers/infringement on the judicial function involves the argument that
by giving the arbitration/screening panel the authority to apply legal
principles to malpractice claims and to make conclusions of law and fact,
these statutes impermissibly infringe upon the function of the judiciary,
thus violating a state's constitutionally protected separation of powers
doctrine. 33 This argument is particularly compelling in states that
require a sitting judge to be one member of the panel because the
likelihood exists that the judge's decision could be overridden by the
other, non-judicial members of the panel, given that a majority vote
typically determines the decision of the panel as a whole. 134 The Illinois
Supreme Court, for example, rested its ruling declaring Illinois' panel
unconstitutional on the tenet that the power to apply the law to the facts
was exclusively the function of the judiciary. 35 Even after the struck
128. See id; see also Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 908 (Ohio
1976).
129. See, e.g., Simon, 355 N.E.2d at 908.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Johnson, 385 A.2d at 78.
132. Id.
133. See Richard C. Turkington, ConstitutionalLimitations on Tort Reform: Have the
State Courts PlacedInsurmountable Obstacles in the Path of Legislative Responses to the
PerceivedLiability Insurance Crisis?,32 VILL. L. REV. 1299. 1324 (1987).
134. See Wright v. Cent. DuPage Hosp., 347 N.E.2d 736, 739-40 (Ill. 1976).
135. Id. at 739.
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statute was revised in response to this ruling, it was still held
unconstitutional36because the makeup of the panel allowed for shared
judicial power.'
37
The Maryland Supreme Court found to the contrary.'
Interestingly, it based its holding on the acknowledgement that "the
essence of judicial power is the final authority to render and enforce a
judgment,"'' 38 ruling that because the arbitration panel is nonbinding, the
power of the judiciary is not infringed. 139 Accordingly, because the right
of appeal to the trial level exists, the panel's decision can be rejected and
is thus not necessarily the final determination of the controversy. 40 The
court found further support for its ruling in the fact that the panel lacks
the statutory authority to enforce its judgment.14' As the power to
enforce remained solely42with the judiciary, no constitutional violation on
this ground was found.'
3.

Overall Effect on the Combined Ratio

Of course, the analysis of a particular mode of reform cannot end at
the determination of constitutionality. Regardless of its constitutionality,
a reform is irrelevant if it fails to remedy its targeted societal ill.
Unfortunately for the numerous states that have enacted various
arbitration/screening panel statutes over the past thirty years, such is the
case here. Because these panels not only fail to reduce the combined
ratio but, in some instances, actually serve to raise it, they are worthless
at best and exacerbate the medical malpractice insurance problem at
worst.
For example, although the Maryland Supreme Court upheld the
1975 Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Act ("HCA") despite the
numerous constitutional challenges described above, once the challenges
passed and the statute went into effect, Maryland's medical malpractice
crisis only became more pronounced. 43 Eight years later, in 1983, the
Maryland General Assembly adopted a Senate Joint Resolution declaring
that the cost of medical liability insurance had increased "tenfold" since
1975, and requested that the governor appoint a commission to study the
136. Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763, 770-71 (11. 1986).
137. Johnson, 385 A.2d at 59.
138. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 65.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 65-66.
143. See Witte v. Azarian, 801 A.2d 160, 166 (Md. 2002) ("Although the 1975-76
legislative response seemed to resolve the immediate 'crisis' of insurance availability,
opposition remained to the arbitration mechanism, and some concern was expressed that
itdid little to stem increases in the cost of malpractice insurance.").
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problem.144 Although the appointed commission downplayed the joint
resolution and claimed that it had overstated the problem, the
commission nevertheless agreed that the HCA was not the cure-all it was
touted to be when enacted. 45 Subsequent, post-mortem analysis of the
HCA sheds light on why it not only failed to achieve its goal but actually
made a bad situation worse.
A 1984 study of the HCA, commonly referred to as the "Liebmann
Report," found that once the HCA went into effect, judgments against
defendants increased significantly. 146 Specifically, under the HCA,
Maryland medical malpractice defendants were successful in only 58%
of cases, compared to a national rate of 80-90%.147 Subsequent to the
Liebmann Report, the HCA was amended to allow both parties to waive
148
the arbitration hearing and proceed directly to the trial level.
Thereafter, a follow-up study found that Maryland medical malpractice
defendants won 62% of cases heard by the panels compared to 70% of
49
cases heard by juries.
While the reasons for this discrepancy are unknown, there is some
thought that perhaps, contrary to popular assumption, the panels are more
pro-plaintiff than are juries, or that the panels, given that two of the three
members are comprised of judicial and medical experts, are more apt to
find true malpractice. 50 Regardless, this rise in plaintiffs' verdicts does
nothing to lower the combined ratio, but rather raises it. Although the
Liebmann Report found that the HCA panels returned lower verdicts on
average than juries ($289,000 vs. $412,000), 1'' the increase in the
number of plaintiffs' verdicts more than offsets this advantage, at least
from the standpoint of the combined ratio.
Upon reflection, the findings of the Liebmann Report should not
have come as a surprise. It simply found that members of the HCA
panels behaved in a manner typical of arbitration panels in most forms of
litigation. At the very core of the nature of arbitration is the desire to
prevent further litigation. As a result, arbitrators naturally feel an urge to
dispense a ruling that gives each side something and minimizes the
144.

Id.

145. Id. The Commission noted that while the overall rate of increase in premium
rates had not exceeded increases in the general cost of health care, there had been
significant physician premium increases in certain specialties. Id. "The Commission
concluded that there were existing conditions and future dangers that warranted some
changes in tort doctrines and the manner in which malpractice claims were processed."
Id.
146. See Trimble, supra note 4, at 902.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 893.
149. Id. at 902.
150. Id. at 902-03.
151. Id.at903.
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likelihood of appeal. This may explain why, in the case of the HCA,
panels found more often for plaintiffs but dispensed lower awards. 152 In
the area of medical malpractice litigation, this approach is doubly
dangerous because reduced litigation costs serve to lower the bar and
encourage additional claims. This results in a medical malpractice
litigation framework that not only fails to address the problem directly,
but exacerbates it indirectly.
Specifically, reduced litigation cost through the use of arbitration
only encourages more claims to be filed overall because, under an
arbitration scheme, litigation costs for plaintiffs are significantly lowered
due to the increased probability that they are likely to receive a favorable
decision from the panel. This likewise encourages the filing of a greater
percentage of dubious claims because under an arbitration system,
litigation is cheaper, quicker, and more likely to result in a plaintiff's
verdict than under a jury system. Numerous claims that previously
would not have been filed due to the high cost and low probability of a
jury award are subject to reassessment under this system. Although the
vast majority of these doubtful claims ultimately and inevitably would
result in defense verdicts regardless of the legal system under which they
were tried, their sheer number has a devastating effect on an insurer's
combined ratio because, as stated earlier, from an insurer's perspective, it
makes no inherent difference whether money is spent on indemnity or
defense dollars. Evidence of the deleterious effect of wasted defense
costs comes from a Maryland study, which found that Maryland's largest
half of its 1986 legal
medical malpractice insurer spent almost 53
1
payment.
without
closed
cases
on
expenditures
In sum, regardless of their constitutionality, although
arbitration/screening panels may very well lessen the likelihood of a
substantial plaintiffs verdict, they nonetheless ultimately prove
irrelevant at best to the combined ratio because, as a tradeoff, they tend
to find for plaintiffs substantially more frequently than do juries.
Moreover, the combination of reduced litigation costs for plaintiffs and a
greater likelihood of success only encourages the filing of numerous
doubtful claims that never would have been filed in the absence of such a
system. This very likely explains why the creation of the HCA
ultimately served to intensify Maryland's medical malpractice crisis.
Thus, contrary to expectations, screening/arbitration panels do not lead to
lower premiums and may very well lead to higher ones.

152. Id. at 902-03.
153. Id. at 910 (regarding the Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of
Maryland).
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Verdict "Capping" and Multipliers

Without question, the most popular forms of malpractice tort reform
(or the ones most loudly called for) are the verdict cap on non-economic
damage awards and/or the punitive damage cap or multiplier. These
types of reform are easily grasped by the public and appear, at first
glance, to make inherent sense when presented in conjunction with some
seemingly convincing statistics regarding large jury awards. However,
as this section shows, because, percentage-wise, so few cases ultimately
go to a plaintiff's verdict, such caps and multipliers are, for the most part,
directly irrelevant to the problem. Moreover, because the overwhelming
majority of cases that settle out of court do so for amounts below the
level of most caps, they are of little indirect relevance as well. However,
these caps do exact an enormous social cost.
1.

The Perceived Justification for Caps and Multipliers

In an effort to promote caps on jury awards, supporters point to
various statistics.
For example, nationally, the size of median
malpractice awards between 1996-2000 rose 110%. 154 In 2000, the
median jury verdict reached $1 million, which represented a 43%
increase over the 1999 figure of $700,000.155 Such increases also, it is
argued, result in higher settlement demands and negotiated
settlements. 56 Based on statistics such as these, the popular perception
is that million dollar verdicts are now the norm in malpractice
litigation.1 57 In Philadelphia, the epicenter of the medical malpractice
reform debate, the call for some form of capping (despite the fact that
capping is prohibited under the Pennsylvania Constitution) is growing
increasingly louder due to what is perceived to be a malpractice litigation
environment out of control, with runaway jury verdicts threatening to
shut down southeastern Pennsylvania's medical community.1 58 This
argument was later buttressed by the White House when in January 2003,
President Bush, citing Pennsylvania's malpractice crisis, singled out
59
exploding jury verdicts as the cause and a nationwide cap the cure.1
154.

See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id.; see also Goldstein, supra note 43. In the Goldstein article, Randall R.
Bovbjerg of the Urban Institute, who examined medical malpractice in Pennsylvania as
part of a Pew Charitable Trust project, stated: "Philadelphia has far more winners as a
proportion than elsewhere, and the million-dollar case is not uncommon. It is the norm
for jury verdicts in favor of plaintiffs." Id.
158.

See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.

159. Bush To Discuss Malpractice Reform, supra note 2. Bush's plan would
supersede state laws and cap noneconomic damages at $250,000 and punitive damages to
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As a result of such talk, caps, in one form or another, have become
quite popular. Currently, twenty-seven states have legislated caps on
punitive damage awards with caps on non-economic damages similarly
popular. 160 The various forms of capping will be discussed in turn.
2.

Punitive Damage Caps

a.

Generally

Currently, twelve states have either "flat caps," which set absolute
limits on the amount of punitive damages awarded, or "multipliers,"
which set a maximum punitive damage award as a multiple of the
amount of compensatory or actual damages awarded. 16 1 For example,
Nevada's multiplier formula simply provides a cap at three times
compensatory damages if they are equal or greater than $100,000, or
$300,000 if the compensatory damages are less than $100,000.162 North
Dakota's multiplier formula caps punitive damages at twice the
63
compensatory damages award or $250,000, whichever is greater.'
or three
Similarly, Indiana's formula caps punitive damages at $50,000
64
greater.'
is
whichever
award,
damages
compensatory
the
times
By way of contrast, the formulas used by Kansas and Oklahoma are
more complicated. The Kansas statute provides that an award for
punitive damages may not exceed the lesser of the defendant's gross
income, $5 million, or 1.5 times the amount of profit the defendant
gained or is expected to gain from the wrong. 65 Under Oklahoma law,
the determination of the punitive damages cap depends on the mens rea
involved.1 66 Therefore, in cases involving recklessness, a punitive
damages award may not exceed the greater of $100,000 or actual
damages.167 However, where the defendant acted intentionally or with
malice, a punitive damages award may reach $500,000 or twice the
actual damages, whichever is greater, or an amount equal to the
increased financial benefit16 to the defendant resulting directly from the
injury-producing conduct.

1

twice actual losses, up to a cap of $250,000. Id.
160. Troy L. Cady, Note, Disadvantaging the Disadvantaged: The Discriminatory
Effects of Punitive Damage Caps, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1005, 1026-27 (1997).
161.
162.

Id. at 1027.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005(1) (2002).

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (2002).
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (2002).
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3701(e)-(f) (2002).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B)-(D) (2003).
Id. § 9.1(B).

168.

Id.

§ 9.1(C).
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Finally, at the extreme end of the spectrum are New Hampshire and
Illinois, which prohibit the recovery of punitive damages altogether in
169
medical malpractice actions.
b.

Constitutionality of Punitive Damage Flat Caps or Multipliers

The overwhelming majority of punitive-damage flat cap or
multiplier statutes have withstood constitutional challenge.
Only
Alabama and Ohio courts have stricken them on a constitutional basis,
with both courts holding that such statutes impermissibly infringe on the
state constitutionally protected right to trial by jury.' 70 Subsequent to the
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, the Ohio legislature modified its
statute by removing the offending language (which stated that punitive
damages were to be limited by the discretion of the court) and replacing
it with a multiplier provision similar to Nevada and Indiana's, which
limited punitive damage awards to the lesser of three times compensatory
damages or $100,000.171 The Ohio Supreme Court struck this provision
as well, 172 resulting in the statutory abandonment of punitive damage
caps in Ohio. 73 The Supreme Court of Alabama, focusing on the
historical role of the jury in the determination of punitive damages,
concluded that because at the time of drafting of the state constitutionally
protected right of trial by jury in 1901 juries were entrusted with the role
of determining punitive damages claims, there could be no limitation of
74
this right without necessarily infringing on this constitutional right. 1
c.

Other Forms of Punitive-Damage Award Limitations

Caps and multipliers are by no means the sole methods of limiting
punitive damage awards. A majority of states, either in conjunction with
a cap or multiplier or standing alone, have statutorily heightened the
requisite burden of proof for the recovery of punitive damages. Thirtythree states require a showing of clear and convincing evidence before
punitive damages may be awarded. 75 Colorado goes even further and
169. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115 (2003).
170. See Henderson v. Ala. Power Co., 627 S.2d 878, 887 (Ala. 1993); Zoppo v.
Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Ohio 1994).
171. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (1999).
172. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1090-91
(Ohio 1999).
173. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(B)(1) (1999).
174. See Henderson, 627 S.2d at 884-92. The court held that it would be improper for
the legislature to substitute itself for the jury and fix "an arbitrary, predetermined limit of
[punitive damages] ... 'which the jury itself is the appointed constitutional tribunal to
award."' Id. at 891 (citing Barry v. Edmunds. 6 S.Ct. 501, 509 (1886)).
175.

See Cady, supra note 160, at 1027 n. 116; see, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
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adopts a criminal proceeding standard, requiring 176
proof beyond a
reasonable doubt for the recovery of punitive damages.
Another method designed by some states to reduce the incentive of
plaintiffs to claim punitive damages is to require that a percentage of any
medical malpractice punitive damage award be paid to sources other than
the plaintiff. A number of states have created funds that are statutorily
required to receive anywhere from 25% to 75% of such awards, with
some states' fund proceeds177earmarked for medical purposes and others
paid into the state treasury.
The constitutionality of these types of statutes varies from state to
state. In Colorado, a statute requiring that one-third of punitive damage
awards be paid into the state treasury was struck down as
unconstitutional under the takings clause of both the United States and
Colorado constitutions. 78 Georgia, on the other hand, upheld a similar
statute in the face of an identical constitutional challenge. 179 Moreover,
the Florida Supreme Court refused to consider constitutional challenges
of any sort with regard to limitations on punitive damage awards because
of its view that because punitive damages are based entirely on public
policy considerations, the legislature is empowered to regulate them in
whatever way it deems fit. 80 Finally, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld
perhaps the most restrictive of these statutes, which required 75% of all
punitive damage awards to be paid into a civil reparation fund.' 8 1 The
court reasoned that because plaintiffs do not have a vested right in
punitive damages prior to the 182entry of judgment, the statute cannot
violate any constitutional rights.
3.

Caps on Non-Economic Damages

a.

"Hard" and "Floating" Non-Economic Damage Caps

Statutorily imposed caps on non-economic damages typically range
from $250,000 to $1 million, with most states adopting a "hard" or
inflexible cap. Others, however, have floating caps that accommodate
§ 2315.21 (C)(2) (2002).
176. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (2004).
177. See Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages Statutes: A
ProposedAlternative, 20 J. LEGIS. 191, 196 (1994).

178. Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 272 (Colo. 1991).
179. Georgia v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993) (upholding GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1 (2003)).
180. Gordon v. Florida, 608 S.2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1992).
181. Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assoc., 473 N.W.2d
612 (Iowa 1991) (upholding IOWA CODE § 668A. 1(2)(b) (1989)).
182. Id. at 619.
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changing economic conditions throughout the years. Idaho's cap, for
example, is set at $250,000 but may be increased or decreased in
accordance with the percentage change in the average annual wage. 183 In
Virginia, a statutorily created 1988 $750,000 cap was raised to $1.5
million in 1999 and will continue to increase in $50,000 yearly
increments until 2008 when it will increase in increments of $75,000.184
The proposed nationwide cap, however, as outlined by President Bush in
January 2003, would set a $250,000 hard cap on non-economic
damages.185 In addition, punitive damage awards would be limited
to a
1 86
cap.
$250,000
additional
an
to
up
losses
actual
twice
of
multiplier
b.

Constitutional Challenges to Non-Economic Damage Caps

Although the constitutionality of hard and floating caps on noneconomic damages varies from state to state, most courts have found
them to be constitutional. As with punitive damages challenges, the
majority of constitutional challenges here focus on state, rather than
federal, constitutional issues. 87 Various challenges have been raised
under state equal protection and/or due process clauses, the separation of
powers doctrine, the state right to remedy provision,88 and/or trial by jury
provisions, with most challenges ultimately denied.1
183.
184.

IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (2003).
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2002).

185. See supra notes 2, 159.
186. See supra notes 2, 159.
187. See infra note 188.
188. The following cases contain successful state equal protection challenges: Moore
v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156, 170-71 (Ala. 1991) (opinion of Adams, J.,
with three Justices concurring, one Justice concurring in result, and one Justice
expressing no opinion) (invalidating ALA. CODE § 6-5-544(b) (2003)); Carson v. Maurer,
424 A.2d 825, 836-38 (N.H. 1980) (invalidating N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C (2003)).
The following is a list of cases in which unsuccessful state equal protection
challenges were asserted: Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 682-84 (Cal.
1985) (upholding CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (2003)); Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C.,
851 P.2d 901, 906-07 (Colo. 1993) (upholding COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2002));
Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 607 So.2d 517, 522 (La. 1992)
(upholding LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:12.99.42 (2002)); Murphy v. Edmunds, 601 A.2d
102, 114-16 (Md. 1992) (upholding MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108
(2003)); Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 903-06 (Mo. 1992)

(upholding Mo. REV. STAT. § 58.210 (2001)); Wright v. Colleton County Sch. Dist., 391
S.E.2d 564, 570 (S.C. 1990) (upholding S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 (2002)); Rose v.

Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1990); Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Serv. of
Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307, 318 (Va. 1999) (upholding VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01581.15 (2002)); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877, 887-88
(W. Va. 1991) (upholding W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2002)); Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp.,
Inc., 623 N.W.2d 776, 788-90 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding Wis. STAT. § 893.55
(2002)).
One case held a state due process challenge successful. Morris v. Savoy, 576
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Capping and the Combined Ratio

Although for the most part passing constitutional muster, these caps
and multipliers, regardless of their form, must then achieve their goal of
lowering health care costs. Unfortunately, as this section shows, because
they are largely irrelevant to such costs, and therefore irrelevant to the
combined ratio, they do not. Moreover, they exact enormous unwanted
societal costs.
As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that because all caps,
regardless of their form, reduce jury verdict awards only and have no
direct connection to cases that settle out of court, they affect an
extremely small percentage of the medical malpractice cases filed
annually. From 1985-1999, only 6.7% of all medical malpractice cases
filed nationally went to verdict. 89 Further, only 1.3% reached a
plaintiff's verdict, the only type directly affected by capping and
multiplier statutes. 190 Thus, the capping and multiplier statutes have no
direct effect on approximately 99% of all medical malpractice cases
filed. Although it can be argued that caps have an indirect effect on
settled cases and serve to drive down settlement demands and the dollar
amounts of negotiated settlements, further inquiry into the mechanics of
most settlements reveals that these caps are largely irrelevant in this area
as well. As such, and with pun intended, the "trickle down" theory holds
little water.
Specifically, the average payout per medical malpractice claim
closed with some sort of payment (via jury verdict or negotiated

N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (Ohio 1991) (invalidating OHIo REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2307.43 (2003)).

Other cases, however, have held state due process challenges unsuccessful. Fein,
695 P.2d at 385; Scholz, 851 P.2d at 907; Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Serv., Inc., 789 P.2d
541, 558 (Kan. 1990) (upholding KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a-01 (2001)); Pulliam, 509
S.E.2d at 318; Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 888; Guzman, 623 N.W.2d at 788-90.
One court has held a state right to trial by jury challenge successful. Moore, 592
So.2d at 164.
However, other cases have held state right to trial by jury challenges unsuccessful.
Kirkland v. Blaine County Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Idaho 2000) (upholding IDAHO
CODE § 6-1603 (2000)); Samsel, 789 P.2d at 558; Murphy, 601 A.2d at 117-18; Wright,
391 S.E.2d at 569-70; Pulliam, 509 S.E.2d at 314-15; Gruzman, 623 N.W.2d at 784-85.
The following cases have held state separation of powers challenges unsuccessful:
Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1122; Wright, 391 S.E.2d at 570; Pulliam, 509 S.E.2d at 319;
Guzman, 623 N.W.2d at 787.
The following cases held state right to remedy or open courts challenges
unsuccessful: Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 906; Wright, 391 S.E.2d at 570; Rose, 801 S.W.2d at
845; Gruzman, 623 N.W.2d at 787.
189. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.
190. Id. The article notes that of the 6.7% of medical malpractice cases which
ultimately went to verdict between 1985-99, only 19.1% of these were decided in favor of
the plaintiff. Id.

1108

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:4

settlement) from 1991-2000 was roughly $120,000.'9' It is important to
note that this number includes the highly publicized "runaway" jury
awards (which in many cases are later and without media fanfare
significantly reduced), along with the more numerous negotiated
settlements. 192 Moreover, this number has remained roughly consistent
throughout the decade, though jumping approximately $14,000 in 1994
and another $16,000 in 1997, years in which the economy was strong and
therefore without sharply spiked premiums. 193 Despite these increases,
the average payout per claim closed with payment in 2000 was still only
$126,270, approximately 50% below the threshold of even the most
restrictive caps.' 94 As a result, even a cap set as low as $250,000 (the
proposed level of the nationwide cap) will likely have a negligible effect
at best on the vast majority of settled claims.
In sum, capping is ineffective mainly because it affects, either
directly or indirectly, an insubstantial number of medical malpractice
cases. Although the caps do serve to eliminate the occasional runaway
verdict, this benefit is largely subsumed in light of the sheer volume of
malpractice cases filed. Because the vast majority of cases settle for
amounts significantly less than even the most restrictive cap, their
presence is largely ceremonial, with this becoming even more so as the
level of the cap rises. Moreover, these caps have absolutely no effect on
the costs associated with the large number of cases filed that ultimately
are dismissed or dropped without an indemnity payment and that, as
stated above, represent the largest area of economic waste in the medical
malpractice arena. Because both indemnity dollars and expense dollars
count equally in the eyes of the combined ratio, the misguided focus and
resultant small benefit on the loss side is more than outweighed by the
costs on the expense side.

191. See Joanne Doroshow, Medical Malpractice Closed Claims Data, Nov. 14,
2001, at http://www.centejd.org/press/release/011114.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2004)
(electronic news release of the Center for Justice and Democracy). Accompanying the
news release is a spreadsheet highlighting closed claim data for the years 1991-2000.
Pursuant to the information provided in this spreadsheet, the average payout per claim
closed with payment by year is as follows: 1991: $100,172; 1992: $105,219; 1993:
$104,751; 1994: $118,682; 1995: $124,978; 1996: $119,296; 1997: $135,487; 1998:
$139,542; 1999: $114,460; 2000: $126,270. Id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See supra notes 161-86 and accompanying text. Research done in conjunction
with the preparation of this Article indicates that the most restrictive caps, such as
California's, regardless of whether they are caps of punitive or noneconomic damages,
are set at $250,000.

2004]

IT'S THE ECONOMY (AND COMBINED RATIO), STUPID

5.

1109

The Societal Costs of Capping

Despite the small percentage of cases affected by the various forms
of capping, these statutes nevertheless exact significant unwanted
societal costs. This becomes evident when those cases affected by caps
(either directly via a limitation on the jury's verdict or indirectly via a
negotiated settlement reduced due to the presence of a cap) are examined
more closely. Upon such examination, it is clear that the small benefit to
the loss (and, consequently, the combined) ratio comes at too high a cost
and is therefore socially unacceptable.
As the level of the cap rises, so does the selectivity of the cases
singled out to bear the brunt (albeit unsuccessfully) of reform. However,
as these cases inherently represent the clearest cases of liability and/or
the most grievous damages suffered, 195 it is contrary to common sense
notions of justice and fairness to place the laboring oar of reform in their
hands. Although there is no question that runaway verdicts occur on
occasion, the preceding section showed that payouts over the past decade
1 96
have not increased significantly in either numbers or dollar amounts.
Rather, and contrary to popular opinion, despite the occasional large
verdict, malpractice payouts have remained steady.' 97 Therefore, on the
whole, medical malpractice payouts to claimants are in response to the
same factors that motivate payouts in other areas of litigation (i.e., the
higher the payout, the more pronounced the liability and greater the
damages). As a result, capping only serves to compel the most
grievously injured at the hands of the most clearly negligent and/or
reckless to bear the brunt of reform.
Moreover, assuming capping was successful, the beneficiaries of
this system, from the perspective of potential medical malpractice
plaintiffs, are the ones who are the cause of the problem, i.e., those who
file doubtful claims in the hope of a quick, cheap settlement. Because
meritless and questionable suits are not impacted by capping, the
incentive to file them is not reduced, with the result being that the
insurer's expense costs (and consequently combined ratio) remain high.
From the perspective of the physician, capping is likewise
undesirable in that such a system protects the most clearly negligent
doctors at the expense of the non-negligent. Those who commit the most

195. Given that there has not been an explosion in medical malpractice indemnity
payouts through the 1990s and early 2000s, which would indicate the possible
involvement of other factors, it is reasonable to assume that the amount of a particular
verdict or settlement in this area of the law is as reliable an indicator of the nature of the
error and/or harm inflicted in that particular case as it is in any other area of litigation.
196. See supra notes 189-94.
197. See supra notes 189-94.
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grievous mistakes and cause the most significant injuries are protected
through a limitation of their liability, while no protection is offered to
those who practice good medicine. Rather, those physicians practicing in
accordance with the acceptable standard of care are no less susceptible to
meritless claims which, while likely to eventually be dropped or
dismissed, nevertheless subject them to months or years of stressful
litigation and mounting expense costs (which result in increased
insurance premiums in the aggregate). As a corollary, the incentive to
practice good medicine is likewise reduced in such an environment given
that bad medicine is protected while good medicine is not. In sum,
because a capping system protects bad medical decisions, punishes the
most grievously injured, and provides no protection of appropriate
medical decisions by doing nothing to dissuade doubtful claims, capping
is damaging from a policy standpoint and socially unacceptable.
Finally, recent evidence indicates that public awareness of the most
recent medical malpractice crisis may have succeeded in lowering the
amounts of verdicts and settlements more effectively than any form of
capping. In Pennsylvania, an uncapped state, the number and dollar
amounts of jury verdicts decreased dramatically in 2002, with the
number of million dollar verdicts decreasing 50% from 2000.198
Moreover, the total amount awarded by Pennsylvania juries in 2002 was
approximately $93 million as compared with $415 million in 2000.199
Whatever impact capping has on an insurer's loss ratio, it is doubtful that
it has had more of an impact than juries acting on their own in the
absence of a cap. Whether Pennsylvania juries in 2002 were in fact more
sensitive to large verdicts due to increased media attention paid to them
and the perceived crisis is unknown at present. Anecdotally, however,
the dramatic drop points to the preferred method of capping-in the jury
deliberation room where the facts and damages of each individual case
can be analyzed by those most familiar with the evidence.

198. See Goldstein, supra note 43. Through August 2002, there had been thirteen
jury awards of $1 million or greater in Pennsylvania, compared with forty-four such
verdicts in 2000. See also Telephone Interview with Josh Goldstein, Philadelphia
Inquirer Staff Writer (Sept. 2, 2003) (wherein this information was updated with statistics
gathered from Pennsylvania's Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund
(MCARE Fund)). According to the MCARE data, there were twenty-two jury awards of
$1 million or greater in Pennsylvania in 2002, a 50% drop from 2000. See id.
199. See Goldstein, supra note 43. According to Goldstein's article of September 22,
2002, Pennsylvania juries awarded $415 million to plaintiffs in 2000, compared with $69
million through August 2002. The 2002 jury verdict information was updated by Mr.
Goldstein in a telephone interview conducted on September 2, 2003 with data gathered
from the MCARE Fund. The final total for 2002 was approximately $93 million.
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C. Certificates of Merit
1.

Generally

The most recent reform technique is what is commonly referred to
as the "certificate (or "affidavit") of merit," whereby a medical
malpractice plaintiff is required to file a certificate (either before, in
conjunction with, or shortly after the filing of the complaint) that
certifies, typically by way of an attached expert report, that the claim is
meritorious. Currently, approximately fifteen states mandate some
variation of this filing.200 New Jersey's statute is typical in that it was
enacted with the express purpose of requiring "plaintiffs in malpractice
cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in
order that meritless lawsuits readily could be identified at an early stage
of litigation.",20 '
The certificate, therefore, provides malpractice
defendants with somewhat of a shield, enabling them to ward off
frivolous suits quickly and inexpensively.20 2
The certificate of merit requirement appears to succeed where other
methods of reform have failed. Maryland adopted its certificate of merit
requirement after its previous method, the arbitration system, produced
little fruit and actually, as stated above, made matters worse. 20 3 In 1987,
the year after the certificate of merit requirement was adopted in
Maryland, medical malpractice filing rates dropped in the state by
36%.204 As such, it has been hailed as the single best deterrent to the
filing of frivolous claims in Maryland.20 5 Its worth relative to its
predecessor, the HCA, is evident in the fact that while the arbitration
method is still an option in Maryland, it is no longer required and both
parties may waive it if they so choose.20 6 The certificate of merit,
however, is mandated regardless of the form of litigation. 20 7 These
certificates or affidavits have proven increasingly popular; some states
200. See Witte v. Azarian, 801 A.2d 160, 168 (Md. 2002) (discussing the
qualifications required of experts in those states operating under certificate of merit
statutes).
201. In re Hall, 688 A.2d 81, 87 (N.J. 1997).
202. See DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1142 (I11.
1992) (noting
that the purpose of Illinois' certificate of merit statute was to "reduce the number of
frivolous suits that are filed and to eliminate such actions at an early stage, before the
expenses of litigation have mounted").
203. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
204. See Trimble, supra note 4, at 907.
205. Id. "The single most effective mechanism for discouraging claimants may be the
certificate of merit." Id.
206. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-06B (2003); see also Witte v.
Arizona, 801 A.2d 160, 162 (Md. 2002).
207. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b) (2003).
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20 8
now require them in product liability litigation as well.

2.

Method and Process

Certificate of merit requirements vary among the states.
In
Maryland, medical malpractice litigation is commenced with the filing of
the complaint. 20 9 The complaint, however, will be dismissed with
prejudice unless, within ninety days of the filing of the complaint, the
plaintiff files a certificate of a qualified expert attesting that the
defendant's conduct constituted a departure from the standard of care and
that the departure was the proximate cause of the alleged injury. z I
In other states, the certificate must be filed in conjunction with the
complaint. 2 1 For example, in Illinois, the affidavit must give the name
and address of the health care professional consulted, and must, along
21 2
with the resulting expert report, be filed with the complaint.
Moreover, Illinois requires the filing of separate reports for each
defendant,21 3 and failure to comply with any of these requirements results
in the dismissal of the action.21 4 There is some leeway, however,
because although the affidavit and expert report are ordinarily required to
be filed commensurate with the complaint, extensions of time are granted
when, despite a good faith effort on behalf of the plaintiff, the defendant
refuses to produce relevant medical records or when statute of limitations
considerations require the plaintiff to file the complaint without the
accompanying affidavit.21 5 In such situations, the plaintiff then has an
additional ninety days to file the affidavit and accompanying report, and
the defendant is excused from responding to the complaint until the
affidavit has been filed.2 16 Finally, if allegations contained within the
affidavit are found to be untrue, either the plaintiff, her attorney, or both
may be compelled to pay the other party's reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees.217
Yet another variation regarding the timing of the certificates comes
from New Jersey.21 8 Its certification statute requires plaintiffs to file an
208. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading:Any Merit to
Special Certificatesof Merit?, 1997 BYU L. REV. 537, 554-55 (1997).
209. See Witte, 801 A.2d at 167.
210. See id.
211. See, e.g., DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (111. 1992).
212. See Alford v. Phipps, 523 N.E.2d 563, 567 (I11.App. Ct. 1988).
213. See id. at 568.
214. See DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1141.
215. See Parness, supra note 208, at 557.
216. See James M. Cutchin, Comment, The 1995 Illinois Civil Justice Reform Act:
Has the Baby Been Thrown out with the Bath Water?, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 117, 124 (1995).
217. See Parness, supra note 208, at 557.
218. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 1999).
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affidavit of "an appropriate licensed person" in any malpractice claim.2 19
This affidavit must be filed within sixty days of the filing of the
defendant's answer and must state that there is a reasonable probability
that the defendant's conduct "fell outside acceptable professional or
occupational standards or treatment practices., 220 Similar to the Illinois
statute, if the defendant fails to cooperate with the discovery required for
22 1
the affidavit, the plaintiff is excused from the certification requirement
but must file a sworn statement that the defendant failed to provide
"information having a substantial bearing on the preparation of the
affidavit., 222 However, in the absence of such misconduct on the
defendant's behalf, failure to comply with the requirements is considered
failure to state a cause of action.2 23
Florida's certification process is a bit more complicated.224 First,
the plaintiff must file a "notification of intent to initiate medical
malpractice litigation.,

225

However, this cannot be filed until the

plaintiff has completed an investigation into the matter.22 6 The results of
this investigation form the substance of the notification of intent, which
must state that the defendant was negligent and that this negligence was
the cause of the plaintiffs injury.227 A "verified written medical expert
opinion" must be filed in conjunction with the notification, corroborating
the grounds for the claim.

228

Once these documents have been filed, the

229
defendant must then commence an investigation prior to responding.
If, after investigating, the defendant chooses to contest the claim, it must
submit a written expert report as well. 230 The report must be completed
by a medical expert and state that "reasonable grounds for lack of

negligent injury exist.

' 23 1

Significantly, if the expert has had any

previous opinion disqualified, the expert must specify the opinion and
the relevant court and case number.232 The filing on behalf of the

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
that of

Id.
Id.
Id. § 2A:53A-28.
Id.
Id. § 2A:53A-29. Georgia's certificate of merit statute is substantially similar to
New Jersey's. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1987); see also Robert D.

Brussack, Georgia's Professional Malpractice Affidavit Requirement, 31 GA. L. REV.
1031, 1032-33 (1997).
224. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203 (West Supp. 1997).

225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

229.

Id. § 766.203(3).

230. Id.
231. Id. § 766.203(3).
232.

Id. § 766.203(4).
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defendant completes the first step of Florida's certification process.
The second step in Florida's certification process occurs only if the
claim fails to settle within ninety days after the notice of intent is filed by
the plaintiff.23 3 In that case, the plaintiff must then file a certificate of
counsel with the initial pleading. 34 The certificate must state that there
was a "reasonable investigation" that gave claimant or his counsel "a
good faith belief that grounds exist" for the action. 235 If the court finds
that the certificate was not completed in good faith and that the claim
was not founded in the law, the court "shall award" costs and attorney's
fees against the counsel and "shall submit the matter. .. for disciplinary
236
review of the attorney.,
Michigan likewise instituted a two-step certification process. 237
Initially, the plaintiff is required to serve the potential defendant with
written notice of the claim 182 days prior to filing. 238 The notice must
contain the "factual basis for the claim," the "applicable standard of
practice or care," the manner of the breach, the action that should have
been taken by the defendant, the manner in which the proximate cause
arises, and the names of all other health professionals and health facilities
who have been notified. 39 If at any time during this 182 day period the
potential defendant informs the plaintiff of its intent not to settle, the
plaintiff may then commence litigation. 4
The second step occurs once the notice period has ended and the
defendant has failed to notify the plaintiff of an intent not to settle.24 ' In
this scenario, the plaintiff may file an action but must attach an "affidavit
of merit signed by a health professional., 242 In it, the expert must:
certify that he/she has reviewed the notice and relevant medical records;
indicate the applicable standard of care; demonstrate how the standard of
care should have been met; and show that the breach was the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury. 2 4 3 Similar to New Jersey's certification
statute, if the Michigan defendant does not provide the plaintiff with
access to the relevant medical records, the plaintiff may be granted an
244
extension to complete and file the affidavit.
233. Id. § 766.106(3)(a).
234. Id. § 766.104(1).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.29121(1) (2001).
238. Id. § 600.2912b(1).
239. Id. § 600.2912b(4)(a)-(f).
240. Id. § 600.2912b(9).
241. Id.
242. Id. § 600.29121d(1).
243. Id. § 600.2912d(l)(a)-(d).
244. Id. § 600.2912d(3). This is similar to Georgia's provisions as well. See supra
note 223.
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Restrictions on Medical Experts

In an effort to reduce the likelihood of professional and/or generic
medical experts, some jurisdictions have placed significant limitations on
the qualifications of medical experts retained in conjunction with the
For example, the Illinois "Healing Art
certification process.
Malpractice" statute requires the court to consider four factors in the
determination of expert qualification:
(a) whether the witness is board certified or board eligible in the
same medical specialties as the defendant... ;
(b) whether the witness has devoted 75% of his or her time to the
practice of medicine, teaching or University based research in
relation to the medical care and type of treatment at issue... ;
(c) whether the witness is licensed ... in the same profession as
the defendant; and
(d) whether, in the case against a nonspecialist, the witness can
the standard of care
demonstrate a sufficient
245 familiarity with
practiced in this State.
Maryland has a similar, but ultimately more restrictive, provision,
forbidding an attesting expert from spending "annually more than 20% of
the expert's professional [time in] activities that directly involve
testimony in personal injury claims., 246 This feature is unique in that
while other jurisdictions, such as Illinois, require medical experts to have
certain specific qualifications, no other jurisdiction ties an expert's
ability to certify a claim solely and directly to the percentage of time
he/she spends testifying in personal injury claims.247
4.

Constitutional Challenges to the Certificate of Merit

a.

Denial of Access to the Courts

Perhaps the most apparent challenge to the certificate of merit is
rooted in the theory that these certificate of merit statutes are
constitutionally infirm because the expert report requirement, either
before or in conjunction with the pleadings stage, effectively bars

245.
246.
247.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-2501 (1993).
MD. CODE ANN. CTS.& JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b)(4) (2003).
See Witte v. Azarian, 801 A.2d 160, 168 (Md. 2002).
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plaintiffs from access to the courts.248 However, these challenges
typically fall short as many courts hold that certificates do not add an
additional burden on the plaintiff.249 Rather, because plaintiffs are
required in the overwhelming majority of medical malpractice cases to
produce an expert report at some point even without the certificate of
merit requirement, the acceleration of this process is not seen as
constitutionally suspect. 250
b.

Equal Protection/Due Process

Like the constitutional challenges under these clauses with respect
to other methods of medical malpractice reform, an equal protection/due
process challenge to certification statutes is based on the theory that they
result in disparate treatment of medical malpractice plaintiffs as
compared with plaintiffs who file suit in other areas of the law. 251 And
once again, the level of scrutiny given to such challenges largely
determines their success.
For example, although the New Hampshire Supreme Court
concluded that strict scrutiny was inappropriate given that no
fundamental rights were involved (having rejected plaintiffs claim that
the right to recover for personal injuries constituted such a right), it
nevertheless held that intermediate scrutiny was required given that the
rights involved (namely, the right to recover damages) were "sufficiently
important to require that the restrictions imposed on those rights be
subjected to a more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the
rational basis test., 252 Under this heightened scrutiny, the court held that
New Hampshire's certification statute, which mandated that no suit could
be filed until the expiration of a sixty day period within which the
defendant could review the plaintiffs notice of claim and supporting
documentation, was unreasonable.25 3 The court noted the statute's
legislative history as indicating that the purpose of the certification
process was to provide defendants with warning of pending expensive
litigation and to enable them to evaluate and consider the possibility of
settlement in order to avoid these costs. 254 However, the court
determined that this did not "fairly and substantially" relate to any
legitimate legislative objective, as even without the certification process
248. See, e.g., DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1145 (I11.
1992).
249. Id. at 1146.
250. Id.; see also Lindberg v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 545 So.2d 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989); Pearlstein v. Malunney, 500 So.2d 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
251. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
252. Id. at 830.
253. Id. at 834-35.
254. Id. at 834.
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the defendant still had ample time to review the claim prior to trial, and
thus the statute only served to postpone the time until a malpractice
victim could expect to recover for his injuries. 25 5 Although the New
Hampshire Supreme Court sorely underestimated malpractice pre-trial
costs, its decision is representative of rulings based on equal
protection/due process challenges under the microscope of heightened
review.
By contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court expressly rejected the
reasoning of their judicial brethren in New Hampshire, and concluded
that rational basis review was appropriate. 6 Applying the identical
rationale used by the Maryland Supreme Court in analyzing an equal
protection challenge to Maryland's arbitration panel, 257 the Illinois court
concluded that because it had previously ruled that the certification
statute does not impermissibly burden a litigant's fundamental right of
access to the courts, there were no fundamental rights involved in the
context of an equal protection analysis.25 8 Accordingly, the court held
that Illinois' certification statute was rationally related to the legitimate
legislative purpose of reducing the number of frivolous malpractice
actions that may otherwise be filed. 259 Rational basis review was
likewise performed in the Florida and New Jersey supreme courts with
similar results.26 °
c.

Separation of Powers

A final constitutional challenge to state certification statutes takes
the form of one based on a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Under this challenge, plaintiffs typically allege that the prerequisite
medical "stamp of approval" of a medical malpractice claim
impermissibly confers upon health care professionals a judicial role.26 1
As only the judiciary is constitutionally empowered to deny an individual
access to the court system, it is alleged that such certification
requirements result in an impermissible blending of the judicial and
witness roles.262
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this claim, however, holding
that the certification process requires medical experts to do nothing more
255. Id.
256. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1142-43 (I11.1992).
257. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
258. DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1152-43.
259. Id. at 1147; see also Bloom v. Guth, 517 N.E.2d 1154, 1156(Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
260. See Lindberg v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 545 So.2d 1384 (Fla. 1989); Pearlstein v.
Malunney, 500 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1987); Barreiro v. Morais, 723 A.2d 1244 (N.J. 1999).
261. See, e.g., DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1143.
262. Id.
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or different than they would otherwise be called upon to do later on at
trial.263 Because the certification process merely accelerates the time by
which the expert report needs to be obtained, the court held it to be
constitutionally sound.264 Importantly, the court noted the distinction
between roles when it stated that while the certification statute required
an advisory opinion of a medical expert to be attached to the plaintiffs
complaint, it was the sole function of the judiciary to take this report into
account in determining the overall sufficiency of the complaint.265
Accordingly, the judge alone has power to dismiss the plaintiff's cause of
action. 266
Further, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the medical expert is
merely providing the opinion of a layman and not a legal professional. 6 7
As such, certification is of the underlying claim and not of the legal
cause of action. 268 Because the power to certify the legal cause of action
remained in the sole dominion of the judiciary, the Illinois certification
requirement did not result in an impermissible sharing of judicial
power.269 This was contrasted with the function of a medical malpractice
screening panel, which was held to violate Illinois' Separation of Powers
doctrine because that panel was empowered to make conclusions and
interpretations of law.27 °
An important distinction to the Illinois Supreme Court and other
courts finding that screening/arbitration panels violate the Separation of
Powers doctrine but certification requirements do not, is the fact that
plaintiffs are free to select an expert of their choosing under most
certification statutes. 27' In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court strongly
hinted that its ruling might very well be different were this not the
2 72
case.

Finally, at least one state, Ohio, invalidated a certification statute
under the Separation of Powers doctrine under the theory that the
procedural requirements contained therein impermissibly conflicted with

263.
264.

Id. at 1144.
Id.

265.

See McAlister v. Schick, 588 N.E.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Ill. 1992).

266. Id.
267. Id. at 1156-57.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See Garland v. Kauten, 567 N.E.2d 707, 709 (I11.App. Ct. 1991).
271. See infra note 272.
272. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1144 (Ill. 1992). "[T]he
statute permits the plaintiff to select his own health professional in obtaining the required
certification, and we need not consider here whether our result would be the same if the
statute designated a specific person or panel to perform that function." Id. (emphasis
added).
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its rules of civil procedure.27 3 The court ruled that because the state
supreme court was empowered by the state constitution to promulgate
rules of civil procedure governing civil matters, any conflicting
procedural rule must therefore violate the Separation of Powers
doctrine.2 74 As Ohio's rules of civil procedure stated that pleadings need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit, a certification requirement
mandating that all medical malpractice complaints be accompanied by an
affidavit signed by the plaintiffs attorney was clearly violative of this
rule and therefore unconstitutional.27 5
5.

Certificates of Merit and the Combined Ratio

Unlike the arbitration/screening panel and capping methods of
malpractice reform, certificate of merit requirements do in fact achieve
their goal of reducing malpractice costs because they exert a tangible
effect on an insurer's combined ratio. This is because certificates of
merit target and, more importantly (unlike arbitration/screening panel
requirements), impact the area of greatest economic waste, namely
expenses incurred in defending meritless medical malpractice cases. In
addition, and crucially, certificate of merit requirements do not affect
those cases which ultimately settle or go to verdict, thus avoiding the
negative societal impact associated with capping statutes.
As discussed earlier, medical malpractice defense costs represent,
comparatively, the largest percentage of an insurer's incurred losses:
roughly 40% as opposed to 13% in all lines of insurance.276 In other
words, malpractice insurers typically spend 40 cents of every dollar on
defense costs as compared with only 13 cents spent by insurers in all
lines. This 27 cent difference can be attributed to, in part, the higher
costs associated with defending complex medical malpractice claims, but
can also be attributed to the fact that roughly 62% of all medical
malpractice cases filed are eventually dismissed or dropped without
277
As a result, medical malpractice insurers typically spend,
payment.
percentage-wise, significantly more on defense costs than do insurers of
other lines of business and, in fact, spend more money defending claims
than on all other administrative costs combined.2 78 Therefore, the most
effective mode of reform will necessarily be the one that effectively
reduces the percentage of meritless claims filed. This, in turn, results in
273.

Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 1994).

274. Id. at 73.
275. Id.
276. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
277. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1. From 1985 to 1999, 62.3% of
all medical malpractice cases were dropped or dismissed in favor of the defendant. Id.
278. See Trimble, supra note 4, at 910.
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a reduction of defense costs. Because defense and indemnity costs are
weighted equally in the calculation of the insurer's combined ratio, a
reduction of defense costs impacts the combined ratio with equal force as
a reduction of indemnity costs. As previously discussed, there is no
inherent reason to target indemnity costs for reform, particularly when it
is in the area of defense costs where significant economic waste abounds.
Given the staggering amount of money spent on the defense of
ultimately meritless claims (as evidenced by research conducted on
Maryland's malpractice litigation environment, which found that in 1986
the state's largest insurer spent almost half of all legal expenditures on
cases eventually closed without payment), 279 and the corresponding large
percentage of them, a successful method of reform will naturally be one
that effectively eliminates meritless suits from the legal system as
quickly as possible. The arbitration/screening panel system attempts to
do this but ultimately fails because by lowering the costs of litigation to
plaintiffs, it unfortunately and, unexpectedly, only encourages an even
greater number of meritless suits. As a result, and as evidenced by
Maryland's HCA reform attempt in the 1980s, while certain, specific
cases are eliminated from the trial system on a micro level, a malpractice
litigation boom will likely result on a macro level as plaintiffs are
encouraged to file doubtful claims due to lower costs and a greater
likelihood of success at the arbitration level.
By contrast, certificates of merit do not lower the costs of litigation
to plaintiffs.
As stated by numerous courts when responding to
constitutional challenges to these statutes, the certificate and attached
expert report requirements require plaintiffs to undertake the same
burden and expense as before, albeit at an earlier stage of litigation.2 8 °
Thus, the unwanted side effects that emerged with regard to the
arbitration/screening panel requirements have been eliminated.
Importantly, certificate of merit statutes succeed where others fail
because they reduce litigation costs to defendants only. As demonstrated
by the failure of arbitration/screening panel reform, reducing costs on
both sides results in giving back on one side all of the gains made on the
other.
Perhaps the most attractive aspect of certificate of merit statutes is
that they succeed in reducing the percentage and costs associated with
litigating meritless claims without affecting the amount paid to
legitimately injured plaintiffs in indemnity payouts. In short, they
succeed in reducing the combined ratio without the deleterious social
effects present in capping statutes. Although certificate of merit
279.
280.

Id.
See supra notes 261-70 and accompanying text.
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requirements do not lower litigation costs to plaintiffs, they do not raise
them either. Therefore, the legitimate plaintiff is ultimately unaffected
by them. The only individuals who feel the sting of these requirements
are those who present doubtful claims and who should be deterred from
the malpractice litigation system in any event-the meritless plaintiffs.
Their lingering presence is what drives the combined ratio of malpractice
insurers up to levels that cause these recurring crises whenever the bond
market weakens. The quick elimination of these unwanted players in the
tort system will result in a lowering of the combined ratio to levels
which, although likely to still be higher than in other lines of business
due to the high costs associated with litigating complex medical
malpractice cases, will be lowered to a point where the cyclical crises
will be less severe than is presently the case.
V.

Conclusion

Regardless of the area of law, in order to properly shape an effective
method of reform the cause must first be properly identified. While it is
tempting to jump to conclusions regarding the cause of the recurring
medical malpractice crises, further analysis reveals that most of the
popularly held assumptions are in fact incorrect. Therefore, it should
come as no surprise that tort reform in this area has largely failed.
Contrary to the widely held belief, there has never been a malpractice
"crisis" insofar as that term implies that malpractice litigation is the root
cause of spiking physician premiums. Rather, due to the nature of the
investment strategy of the insurance industry, these spikes naturally and
precisely correlate to the rise and fall of the bond market.
However, contrary to those economists who conclude that given this
economic link tort reform of any sort is irrelevant to the solution, an
analysis of the calculation and effect of the combined ratio on an
insurer's profit margin during weak bond markets shows that reform that
seeks to lower this ratio will be effective in reducing the impact of the
market during these inevitable cyclical downswings.
Unlike the
arbitration/screening panel and "capping" methods of reform, certificate
of merit requirements not only target the area which is most responsible
for raising malpractice insurers' combined ratios, they effectively act to
reduce this area of waste.
Unfortunately, those states enacting certificate of merit statutes have
not enjoyed their full benefit because such statutes are typically one of
several methods of reform enacted within the jurisdiction. As a result,
the economic benefits derived from the certificate of merit statutes are
diluted by other, less effective modes of reform, some of which (as with
arbitration/screening panels) unintentionally encourage the filing of
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doubtful claims and offset the economic benefits to insurers. 281 This may
explain why Maryland was unable to sustain the sharp decline in filing
rates the year after implementation of its certificate of merit statute.282
Because its highly ineffective arbitration statute remained in effect,
prospective plaintiffs who were most likely discouraged from filing due
to the higher initial costs associated with the acceleration of the expert
report requirement were eventually drawn back into the system by
reduced costs in other areas and the greater likelihood of a plaintiff's
verdict. As the Maryland example demonstrates, less, at least in the
context of medical malpractice litigation reform, is often more.
However, given that it is typically difficult to "unring the bell" and
discard the ineffective methods of reform that survive, it is unlikely that
those jurisdictions that add the effective certificate of merit requirement
to the heap of failed experiments preceding it will realize many of its
benefits.

281. See supra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
282. See Trimble, supra note 4, at 907. In 1987, the year after the certificate of merit
requirement went into effect, the medical malpractice filing rate declined approximately
36% from the previous year. Id. By 1996, however, filing rates had nearly returned to
their pre-certificate levels. Id.

